Showdown at the DWI Corral

by Joseph P. Rem, Jr.

The good driving while intoxicated (DWI) defense attorney is a gunslinger. You're fighting on their turf. The odds are always against you, and everybody is gunnin' for you. It's you against the world. The prosecutor has his posse - the sheriff, the cops, the facts, the law, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, public opinion, and you're not too sure about the judge. You're alone, armed only with a six-shooter of preparation, knowledge, guts, attitude, salesmanship, and a reckless disdain for the consequences of the shootout that looms.

Initial Client Interview

The gunslinger knows success in any shootout begins with preparation.

The defense of a SWI case begins the same as the defense of any criminal case, and make no mistake about it, a DWI case will be prosecuted with the thoroughness and aggressiveness of an indictable criminal case. The drunk driving defense atmosphere has reached the point where even actual innocence no longer seems to be a viable defense. The first step is not, contrary to popular opinion, learning the facts. The first step is to learn the case law, so you can be sensitive to the issues in your initial client interview, separating the wheat from the chaff and following the promising threads of potentially exculpatory information.

The initial interview focuses on all of the facts and circumstances not only of the arrest, but of the hours preceding arrest, right up through the time the accused (he or she is not a defendant; he or she has no obligation to defend; the burden is always on the state) awoke that morning.

Tiredness is almost always a factor in, and an explanation for, the police observations. Other facts are also important; including whether your client has previously been convicted of this offense (and if so, whether he or she was represented by counsel or afforded an opportunity for a public defender), the existence of any medical conditions which might mimic intoxication (head injury, allergies, ankle injury) or give a false breathalyzer reading (diabetes, for instance), and the names of witnesses (which must be supplied to the prosecution in reciprocal discovery).

The initial discussion must include the setting of a fee to fairly compensate the attorney for the enormous amount of time that will go into properly preparing a DWI defense. Make the client commit economically - and commit in return your heart, soul, time and professional reputation. Do not sell either yourself or the client short by setting a fee which does not reflect this commitment to professional excellence, and which does not adequately compensate you for the enormous amount of work needed to properly defend the case.

For a multitude of reasons, including your professional obligations, a written fee agreement is a must. A few sentences confirming your retention will simply not suffice; the letter must set forth all terms of the agreement, including the responsibilities of the client to be cooperative and pay all fees, a full explanation of what will occur if the financial arrangements are unfulfilled, and a reminder that no result is implied or guaranteed. Use this opportunity to inform the client in writing of the penalties.

If you feel the urge to give the client an estimate of the chances for success, don't. Do so only after a review of the discovery. And remember that when you ultimately do so, (every client asks this question) give an estimate that is not artificially inflated in a misguided attempt to secure the accused as a client, or to tell the client what he or she "wants" to hear. Every DWI is an uphill fight - steel the client for this from the outset.

Lastly, and importantly, you must ascertain and put into writing the client's goals, needs and expectations. These notes will drive the litigation strategy.

Appearance and Discovery

The careful gunslinger learns the lay of the land before riding into town.

The initial appearance should be filed as soon as the attorney has been retained, but not before. It is embarrassing to the attorney and annoying to the municipal court administrator to enter an appearance, only to have to withdraw it later on (if permitted) because the client has failed to meet his or her obligations.

The request for discovery should accompany the initial appearance. The request for discovery should be addressed to the municipal prosecutor at the municipal building. As a practical matter, copy the municipal court administrator so the court files will confirm that the letter was in fact mailed) as well as the discovery officer of the local police department. Copy your client on everything that comes into our out of your office.

Demand discovery pursuant to Rule 3:13-3 and Rule 7:4-2(h). The state is required to respond within 10 days,1 but don't hold your breath. Discovery in DWI cases has been curtailed by case law,2 but it remains clear that if you can show that an item requested in discovery is both potentially exculpatory and in the possession or constructive possession of the prosecution (and that includes all governmental law enforcement agencies) then the court should order its production.

Remember to supply the state with reciprocal discovery, including the names of all witnesses. In the case of expert witnesses, supply their reports, or if no reports are available, written summaries of the oral report. Once you have seized the moral high ground by supplying the report, object if the state calls an expert without similarly providing a report.

At a minimum, in discovery you should receive the following:

  • The front and back of all summonses
  • Narrative report
  • Drunken driving report
  • Alcohol influence report
  • Breath test instrument inspection certificates for not only the time period before and after your client's arrest, but for the 12 months preceding the date of the arrest.
  • Assay report for the ampoules
  • Certificate of analysis for the simulator solution
  • Copy of the breathalyzer operator's certification card
  • Scientific examination of any blood or urine samples
  • Any results of defendant's performance on psychophysical test

The day your receive the discovery, a copy should be sent to your client asking that he or she review the material and contact you immediately to discuss it. Also remind the client to supply you with the names of any witnesses he or she may wish to call, to satisfy the reciprocal discovery obligation.

Either at this time, or after consultation with the client, you may wish to submit the materials to a breathalyzer expert or a physician, depending on the issues in your case. As a practical matter, it is wise to first evaluate the observations of your client. Finances are usually (but not always) a concern, and if the discovery reveals the client to be a 'falling down drunk," the expenditure may not be warranted, but it is your client's call, not yours.

No matter how incriminating the evidence, however, none of it gets into evidence if the stop was unconstitutional.

Search and Seizure

If the sheriff's bad, you gotta take on the sheriff.

Two of the most powerful tools in the defense attorney's arsenal are the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey State Constitution. It does not matter how powerful or damning the state's evidence is if it is inadmissible by virtue of its unconstitutional seizure.

The first question the defense attorney asks is: Was there probable cause for the vehicle stop?

If your client is cited for changing lanes without signaling, ask whether other traffic was affected,3 if the officer did a look-up on the license plate and learned that the owner of the vehicle had his or her license suspended; whether the officer made any attempt to match the description of the owner to the driver.4

If all the driver did was veer two or three feet out of his or her lane while driving on a curving road at night, question what is so erratic about that and why it indicates intoxication.5

If your client was involved in a one-care accident, question what there was about the circumstances that allowed the police officer to conclude that your client was intoxicated.6

When your client is pulled over for an alcohol-neutral reason (i.e. speeding), evaluate carefully his or her performance on the physical coordination tests, and whether there was even probable cause to have your client perform those tests. Requiring your client to exit the vehicle to perform tests is, in and of itself, a seizure, and the officer must have probable cause, which as we know is

more that bare suspicion; probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.7

The New Jersey Supreme Court has made the definition simpler yet:

probable cause exists when a prudent man would be warranted in the belief that a crime probably is being committed.8

Hammer on the distinction between mere suspicion and facts which demonstrate that an offense is probably being committed (there is a world of difference, but the subtlety of that difference may be lost unless forcefully brought to the fore); remind the court that the reviewing standard is not just a "reasonable person," but a person of "reasonable caution."

This "search and seizure sampler" is nothing more than that. The DWI defense attorney knows search and seizure law intimately, and embraces with a loving passion each newly decided case, filing it away mentally for future reference. Each new case is another bullet in the defense gun.


Can't rightly say, sheriff, how my horse got into town. Reckon somebody must have rode him in.

No one can be convicted of DWI unless he or she "operates" a motor vehicle. Traditionally, "operation" has been thought to mean "driving." at least by lay people foolish enough to rely on the plain meaning of the term. After all, how many people have been killed or injured by a parked car? Our courts, however, have held that a person in a parked car can e convicted of "operating
the motor vehicle, if he or she is in actual physical control of the car and attempts to operate it with the intent to drive.9

Your client can be convicted for merely steering a disabled car while it is being pushed, or being behind the wheel of a car that is coasting down a slight incline.10 On the other hand, since the intent to drive is required, a person who is outside a tavern, seated behind the wheel of a running vehicle, may not be convicted if he or she can raise a reasonable doubt as to whether it was his or her intent to drive, as opposed to simply stay warm while sleeping off the alcohol.11

It is required that the state only prove operation, not actually witness the operation. Operation can be proven by circumstantial evidence, or an admission by the accused. The offense need not occur on a public road; operation on private property will suffice to sustain a conviction (for DWI, but not for refusal).12 Note: Contrary to common belief, making it into the driveway before the pursuing officer can stop you is not a defense.

The Observation Case

The gunslinger knows his adversary is quick on the draw - and a deadly shot. Hell, that's the challenge.

In the regrettable absence of a videotape, the police officer has free rein to describe your client in a manner consistent with his or her issuance of the ticket. Each and every damaging observation has its inherent weakness, and cross-examination is the time to expose it. The accused seemingly always has:

  • a "slurred voice," but never so slurred that the officer does not understand the responses to his or her questions;
  • "fumbling and slow" hand movements, but almost always produces the requested credentials;
  • the "strong" odor of an alcoholic beverage on his or her breath, but no sane and truthful officer will ever link the strength of that odor to the amount (as opposed to the type and recency) of the alcohol consumed;
  • bloodshot and watery eyes, but is almost always stopped in the early morning hours.

Ask the questions that make your points:

  • When you asked my client (fill in the blank), did he or she appear to understand the question?
  • Did he or she give you an answer that was responsive to the question asked?
  • Did you understand the answer?
  • Did you ask my client how long he or she had been awake? He or she had allergies? A bad back? Been injured in the accident?
  • When you activated your overhead lights, did he or she pull over in a reasonable amount of time? In an appropriate manner? In an appropriate place?
  • When you asked my client if he or she had been drinking, did he or she respond with what you perceived to be the truth?
  • When you asked him or her to take the breathalyzer, did he or she hesitate before agreeing to take the test?
  • Did he or she seem to understand the standard warnings about the obligation to take the breathalyzer? With all the statutory citations? And fines and penalties?
  • Did he or she have any trouble giving you breath samples? Seem to be playing games, trying to avoid giving a proper breath sample?
  • Did he or she call anyone to get a ride home? Seem to dial the correct number? Reach the person who ultimately picked him or her up?

Roadside tests are patently unfair. They are performed on poorly lit, gravel-strew, uneven roadsides, scant feet from high-speed traffic, in the presence of at least one fully-armed police officer in front of a vehicle with whirling halogen-intense lights, under circumstances producing anxiety, humiliation and terror. The comfort of the courtroom belies the reality of the street, and a careful cross-examination must be undertaken to transport the judge on a cerebral journey to that very scary place and time when your client was asked to perform these "simple" tests. Were they performed again in the civilized and controlled environment of the police station? Likely not. And then again, why not?

On the other hand, just because the cop mistakenly perceives your client as drunk because he or she was weaving across all lanes of a highway, and when finally pulled over could neither recite the alphabet, stand without assistance, nor speak without a slurred voice, does not mean the accused is drunk. You know that the client:

  • was extremely sleepy,
  • was adjusting the radio controls,
  • had just dropped a lit cigarette in his or her lap while frantically swatting the bee that flew into the car,
  • had not recited the alphabet since kindergarten,
  • suffered from allergies,
  • had contact lenses in for 16 straight hours,
  • and might very well always speak in a slurred voice - hey, had the cop ever heard your client speak before?

Ask on cross-examination, and rhetorically in summation, why, if an accurate description of a drunk driving suspect's demeanor and physical coordination is so critical, did that police department years ago cease using its video equipment? Ask if the equipment is still in headquarters. Since the burden is on the state to produce the evidence of guilt, ask the judge to draw a negative inference from the absence of a videotape. Remember, reasonable doubt arises not only from the evidence presented, but from the absence of evidence.

The Breathalyzer

Even the best six-shooter ever made jams sometimes.

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 allows for the defendant to be convicted on either of two separate and distinct grounds. The first, the more traditional, is that the defendant walked like a drunk, talked like a drunk and drove like a drunk. The other is that the defendant committed a status offense, that is, operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or higher. In fact, municipal court judges are instructed to make findings as to both bases.13

The majority of drunk driving prosecutions involve the use of the breathalyzer, and the greater your familiarity with it, the better your chances of successfully defending your client. As with all other fields of law, if you are not highly conversant with the breathalyzer and its proper operation, appear to be, keeping a breathalyzer expert in your hip pocket.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has defined the breathalyzer to be the first perfect machine in the history of western civilization, one impervious to mechanical defects and immune to the laws of the electromechanical university, oblivious to physiology. This makes the attack upon it somewhat daunting; it also makes it fun.

The state has a heavy burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, 14 that the equipment was in proper order, the operator was qualified, and the test was given correctly.15 It is important to remind the court that breathalyzer test results are often the sole evidence against the defendant, and as such become dispositive of a violation of the law. Consequently, the risk of error should be reduced as much as possible.16

Remind the judge that the Supreme Court, in State v. Garthe,17 commented that the accused's right to drive and liberty will depend on the "verdict" of a machine. Remind the judge that if the machine is going to be rendering the verdict in the case, rather than merely being evidence of guilt, then it should be subject to as rigorous and scrupulous an examination of its background ad was the judge at the time of his or her appointment. Remind the court of that heavy burden every time there is questionable operation, or where documentary evidence is incomplete.

If the reading comes into evidence, excluding issues of operation, the case is essentially over, a per se offense has been proven. The key to the DWI defense is excluding the breathalyzer reading from evidence.

In the old days, the reading was not fatal, because an expert could extrapolate your client's reading back to the time of driving, thus proving that your client was under the legal limit at the time of the operation of the motor vehicle. In State v.Tischio,18 the Supreme Court put the kibosh to that. However, the state must still prove that the test was given within a "reasonable time." It must be given by a certified breathalyzer operator.19 An operator certification remains valid for the year in which he or she was certified, plus two calendar years thereafter.20

The breathalyzer machine is rarely inspected by the state police on the day your client was arrested. The question arises as to how, then, can the state prove it was in proper operating condition on the day of the arrest. The traditional method has been to show that it had been inspected before the date of your client's arrest, and at some time thereafter. The court can then draw the inference that it was working at all times in between.

Recent case law, particularly State v. Storm,21 suggests that there is no evidentiary need for a subsequent inspection. Sandstrom specifically disapproves State v. Samarel,22 which held that a subsequent inspection was unnecessary only if the machine had been tested within the prior 30 days. This is an issue that has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court, and counsel should argue the sheer illogic of these cases. The machine should be tested by the state police on the same day your client was tested - that is the only true way to know if it is in proper working order at the time.

Allowing the inference that it was working properly on the date of your client's arrest because it was working when inspected at times both before and after the test was administered to your client is conceding much tot he state, but at least it's logical. With just a before test, what proof is there that it did not malfunction in the interim? Has the state sustained its "heavy burden?"

Both cases would seem to be mooted by State v. Maure,23 which holds that the foundational requirements for the admission of the breathalyzer readings are not met unless the breathalyzer inspection certifications indicating that "random sampling testing of the ampoules from the same batch that was used in the defendant's breathalyzer tests has been conducted both before and after" your client's testing. No subsequent inspection? Then there is no proof the ampoules contained the proper chemicals mixed to the proper proportions. No private laboratory testing of the ampoules suffices to supplant this requirement.

There appears to be no case law overruling Maure. Counsel should argue that Samarel and Sandstrom not withstanding, it is still required that there be both a before and after inspection of the machine to prove the reliability of its essential component parts - the ampoules.

The lesson? Always determine if the same ampoule used to test your client was used by the state police in testing the breathalyzer, both before and after the date of your client's arrest.

It is also important to argue, in cases of a .11 percent blood alcohol content reading or lower, simulator solution alcohol depletion.25 The Appellate Division has held that there is sufficient question as to whether the breath alcohol simulator solution has become so depleted after repeated uses as to call into question the accuracy and validity of the readings. The accused would have to produce expert testimony to support this proposition.

Remember that the DWI is no different in many ways than any other case. In order to introduce the breath readings, the state must tie together basic points in the testimony. Make a mental checklist of what the state proved in its case:

  • Did it tie in by serial number the breathalyzer's inspection certifications to the machine used to test your client? If not, there is no proof the breathalyzer used to test your client was ever inspected.
  • Same with the ampoules - tied in to the before and after inspections by lot number?
  • And what of the simulator solution used by the trooper coordinator in inspecting the machines - documentary proof that it was tested?
  • Was the time of the stop proven, so that the court could make the Tischio-required determination as the "reasonableness" of the time between the driving and the test results?
  • Did the state affirmatively prove that hand-held radios were banned from the testing area to prevent interference?26
  • Were the two readings within .01 of each other?27 (Argue, for example, that on readings of .12, .13, the state failed to exclude the possibility that the readings were actually .120 and .139, more than .01 apart).


A gunslinger knows that shooting yourself in the foot is to be avoided at all times.

Drivers are required to submit to a breathalyzer test if the officer has "reasonable grounds" to believe the person was driving while intoxicated (driving on purely private property does not count - this is different than DWI)28 The state's burden to prove this offense is simply a preponderance standard.29 The loss of license and Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC) penalties for refusal are identical to those for DWI, and the fines range between $250 and $500.

A refusal is anything except an unequivocal "yes" to the request to take the test.30 An accused has no right to counsel prior to making this crucial decision.31 A defendant who refuses, but within a reasonable period of time consents to take the test, may, perhaps, "cure" the refusal.32 Giving only one breath sample when two are requested is a "refusal."33 Of course, if one breath sample does not constitute a valid test, neither is that result admissible. An accused convicted of both DWI and refusal pays only one insurance surcharge.

Independent Test

When the gunslinger's been shot bad, he always tries to get off that one last shot as he falls to the ground.

The police are required to establish reasonable procedures to afford the accused the opportunity to exercise the right to an independent blood test; failure to so provide will result in the suppression of the breathalyzer test results.34 If your client desires to obtain an independent blood test, the police have an obligation to allow a telephone call for the purposes of arranging such a test.35 The police, however, are under no obligation to inform your client of his or her right to an independent test.36


Taking the next stage out of town is always better than spending time in the local hoosegow.

Despite the fact that your client, convicted of a third DWI offense, can go to jail for 180 days, lose the right to drive for 10 years, and pay thousands of dollars in fines and surcharges which can result in civil judgments, these "statutory penalties . . . [are not] so severe as to clearly reflect the legislative determination of a constitutionally serious offense requiring jury trial."37 This from the same court that gave us Tischio, which tortured the rules of statutory construction (". . . the statute . . . cannot be applied literally") to facilitate the conviction of accused drunk drivers, because drunk driving is a serious national problem and drunk drivers are "moving time bombs" waiting to "detonate."

For a person convicted of a first offense, DWI carries with it fines imposed by the court totaling between $500 and $700; loss of driving privileges from a minimum of six months to a maximum of 12 months (and no provisions to allow driving to and from work); insurance surcharges of $3,000 ($1,000/year for three years), an increase in insurance rates which could, over the next three years, approach $3,000 (it varies among insurance companies); mandatory attendance at alcohol rehabilitation classes for two six-hour days, with the possible subsequent requirement of three to four months attendance at an out-patient program; payment for the alcohol rehabilitation classes at the IDRC, as well as a $50 license restoration and $100 alcohol program fee.

There will also be an additional fee of $150 payable upon attendance at the IDRC program. The penalties also call for the possibility of a jail term, although that possibility is remote.

The penalties for a second offense are similar, but with a two-year loss of license, 48 consecutive hours at the IDRC, and 180 hours of community service. The draconian penalties for a third offense include a 10-year license loss and 180 days in jail.

The real art and craft of sentencing lawyering is demonstrated on the third (or subsequent) offenses. The judge has no discretion over the $1,000 fine nor the 10-year loss of license. However, with respect to incarceration, two alternatives present themselves. A court may allow the person to serve up to half of the 180-day required term performing community service. The court may also sentence your client to serve the time in an in-patient program for alcohol rehabilitation.

After serving an appropriate period of time in an in-patient program (most are 28 days), your client can apply to have the balance of the sentence served as an out-patient. N.J.S.A. 39:4-51 allows your client to be entered into an out-patient program "upon petition by the treating agency." This can normally be accomplished by a letter from the in-patient facility stating the length of time your client has served, the fact that he or she has successfully completed the program, and a recommendation that his or her alcohol rehabilitation needs can be successfully met on an out-patient basis.

If your client needs in-patient rehabilitation (and most third-time offenders do), do not hold off obtaining the necessary help until after sentencing. The court has discretion to allow retroactive credit for attendance at the in-patient rehabilitation program.38

Anytime there is a 10-year gap between consecutive DWI offenses (dates of driving, not dates of conviction), the number of your client's prior offenses decreases by one. If your client has a prior out-of-state conviction, argue that it counts as a prior only if the other state is a signatory to the Interstate Compact.39 Even if it is a member of the compact, argue that case law40 holds that a "defendant's conviction for drunk driving in New York . . . may be considered as a prior violation for sentencing under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50." Courts clearly know the difference between the words may and shall; the Appellate Division could have used either, and chose may.

The use of the out-of-state conviction may very well be discretionary, and submission of proof at sentencing that the out-of-state offense would not have been an offense in New Jersey (for instance, a conviction with a .07 percent BAC) might persuade the court to your point of view.

A prior conviction where the accused did not have counsel, and was not informed of his or her right to counsel, cannot be used to enhance the incarceration for a subsequent offense.41 When the accused was deprived of counsel because he or she was indigent and would have derived benefit from the notice by seeking the assistance of counsel, the prior uncounseled conviction cannot be used to impose the longer loss of driving privileges associated with the subsequent offense. An accused who was not indigent must show in addition that the lack of notice otherwise affected the outcome.42


A gunslinger knows that a coward dies a thousand deaths - a brave man dies but one.

By the nature of their chosen profession, gunslingers only lose once in their careers - not so the DWI defense attorney. If you obsess about winning or losing, defending DWI cases is a bad career choice. The good DWI attorney focuses on the fight, not the outcome; on doing everything that is legally, morally, ethically and strategically permissible, stretching the bounds of creativity, assuming nothing, challenging everything, being unrelenting in pursuing every avenue leading to possible acquittal, and then letting the chips fall where they may. In a world where we have neither the law nor the facts, when you reach the showdown at high noon, this is - sometimes - just enough.

Joseph P. Rem Jr. is a Certified criminal Trial Attorney practicing in Hackensack. A former county assistant prosecutor, he is a partner in the firm of REM ZELLER law group, a professional corporation He is the co-chair of the Bergen County Criminal Practice Committee, and is the former chair of the Bergen County Municipal Court Committee.


State v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1990).
Ford, supra at 48.
State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302 (1994).
State v. Lewis,288 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Parks, 288 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1996).
Gustavson v. Gaynor, 206 N.J. Super. 540, 546 (App.Div. 1985).
State v. Schreiber, 240 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1990).
Brinegar v. United States, 330. U.S. 160, 175 1949.
State v. Simms, 75 N.J. 337 (1979).
State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467 (1987).
State v. Jeanette, 172 N. J. Super. 567 (Law Div. 1980); State v. Stiene, 203 N. J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 1985).
See State v. Sweeney, 40 N.J. 359 1963) and State v. Daley, 64 N.J. 122 (1973).
See State v. McColley, 157 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 1978).
State v. Sisti, 209 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1986).
Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66 (1984).
State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 171 (1964).
Romano, supra.
State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1, 12 (1996).
State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504 (1987).
State v. Johnson, supra.
N.J.A.C. 13:51, 17(a).
State v. Sandstrom, 277 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1994).
State v. Samarel, 231 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 1989).
State v. Maure, 240 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 1990).
Id. at 281.
State v. Slinger 281 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1995).
Romano, p. 85.
Id. at p. 88.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.
State v. Bernhardt,245 N.J. Super.210 (App.Div. 1991).
Bernhardt, supra.
State v. Corrado,184 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 1982); State v. Ginnetti, 232 N.J. super. 378 (Law Div. 1989).
State. v. White, 253 N.J. Super. 490 (Law Div. 1991).
State v. Broadly, 281 N. J. Super. 230 (Law Div. 1992).
State v. Hicks, 228 N. J. Super. 541 (App. Div. 1988).
State v. Mercer, 211 N. J. Super. 388 (App. Div. 1986).
State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109, 111 (1990).
State v. Fytte,244 N.J. Super. 310, 315 (App. Div. 1990).
N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 et seq..
Regan, 209 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 1986).
State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990).
Id. at 4-5.